Columbia University Libraries Digital Collections: The Real Estate Record

Real estate record and builders' guide: [v. 97, no. 2503: Articles]: March 4, 1916

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REAL, ESTATE NEW YORK, MARCH 4, 1916 WHY WE DO NOT HAVE HOME RULE Same Principles Should Apply to City and State As Govern Between State and Federal Authorities By Dr, FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND, Director, Bureau of Municipal Research WHILE there are certain points of the local administrative and finan¬ cial problem in which Mayor Mitchel's demand for home rule centers, it may be of value to give a wider perspective to the issue. Fundamentally, the struggle for home rule has in it nothing new. It carries with it an issue over which men have disputed for centuries—the question as to where the jurisdiction of the State shall end and the jurisdiction of the city or other local government shall be¬ gin. This was a factor in the politics of the Roman Empire, in the middle- age-adjustments with feudalism, in the struggles for constitutional government in England. The best that can be hoped for is that as much of self government will be left to the citizens of each lo¬ cality as is compatible with the pur¬ poses of the broader establishment. In making decision as to where the line of authority shall be drawn, exactly the same principles should govern as be¬ tween State and Federal authority—viz: each jurisdiction should do the things it is best fitted to do with as little inter¬ ference as possible. Subject to the more general principle of unity of parts, each should do the things that primarily af¬ fect its own constituency. The Home-Rule Principle. Services, like diplomacy, national de¬ fense, regulation of commerce, that af¬ fect the welfare of the nation as a whole, together with those activities which are. general in application and which cannot with equal advantage be administered by state governments, should be adminis- teied by the federal agency; those ac¬ tivities which are general in character but which can best be administered by states should be so conducted; the func¬ tions and activities that have to do with the well being of local communities should be lett to local government—the .State retaining only such an overlordship aj will contribute to good administration. This is an ideal which has been de- parteil from. In this State and other States, legislation having to do with cities and other local governing units has not infrequently turned on quite another point. It is not because anyone thinks that the question as to what salaries New Yorlc City pays its teachers is primarily a State-wide matter that we have State legislation on the subject. It is not be¬ cause the Legislature at Albany is better qualified or is more closely in touch with the police problem of New York, with the l(>cal street cleaning problem or the local fire fighting problem, that men run to Albany for legislation. What is usually overlooked is the fact that the demand for legislation which in¬ terferes with the principle of home rule originates in the locality affected. The reasons for this local demand relate to one or the other or both of two assump¬ tions: (1) either that the local authorities cannot be trusted. (2) or that the legis¬ lative is a more favorable instrument for the protection of special interests. The first assumption is a fundamental defect in all our political thinking—it is reflected in all our constitutions and charters. It lias been made, however, in what has been conceived to be the interest of com¬ mon weliare—is a result of patriotic im- DR. FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND. pulse. The second assumption, on the other hand, is selfish and unpatriotic— an outgrowth of local organization for spoils. Let us consider first the assumption that the local authorities cannot be trusted. This is inherent in the thinking of the American people. They distrust all authoiity; they distrust everybody and everything connected with author¬ ity; they even distrust their own electo¬ rate. Our government was conceived in distrust —and to this end our con¬ stitutions and charters are looked to to prevent those in authority from doing harm. Distrust of Public Officers. This observation is not made to de¬ tract from the value of those great char¬ ters which were worked out by our fore¬ fathers. But their title to renown lies in the protection which they have af¬ forded to the liberties of the people. As charters of liberty, American charters and constitutions are among the world's masterpieces of political thought; as charters of incorporation for doing busi¬ ness (the business of the people), they are among the world's greatest failures. And they are failures for the reason that popular distrust of government caused our constitution makers to seek pro¬ tection in the emasculation of author¬ ity—in putting limitations on the exer¬ cise of powers, instead of giving to offi¬ cers the powers needed to make them effective public servants and at the same time adopting devices to make them re- sponsible and responsive to the will of the people This is the thing that distinguishes our political development from the political development of England, France and other countries which have responsible governments. Up to the tiine of the American Revolution, English govern¬ ment was not responsive and responsible; that was the reason for our revolt. We sought to proiect our liberties first by revolution, then by a process of emascu¬ lation; they have also had their revolts, but these have been followed by devel¬ oping methods of effective popular con¬ trol without emasculation. And as pop¬ ular control has been made more effec¬ tive, as confidence has grown, the powers and functions of the government itself have been increased. Observe how these two systems have worked out in local as well as in state government. To the very extent that control over the government has been perfected, to the extent that the govern¬ ment was made responsive and respon¬ sible, the people came to trust their exe¬ cutives and legislatures. Under a sys¬ tem of effective popular control only such men could continue in office as were trusted by a majority. The result has been, the government had the means of knowing at all timts where a majority stood on every question; and the people could force the retirement of officers who did not have a majority back of them. The reaction has been one of mutual trust. Our ofiicers, on the other hand, have had no way of knowing whether a majority is back of them on any meas¬ ure while it is under discussion; the peo¬ ple have had no way of enforcing re¬ sponsibility and making the government responsive. In America there has been a growing distrust, a growing discon¬ tent. An administration is seated by a majority, then there is a cumulation ol dissatisfaction and distrust until the end of a fixed term, say four years, when the thing to be expected happens: the elec¬ torate "turns the rascals out." Appeals to State for Protection. Since tliere is no provision made for keeping the government and public opin¬ ion in adjustment—no way of enforcing the opinions of a majority on officers— increasing distrust has caused the people to go to the State capitol to get measures adopted which will operate to take away from local officers powers which they alone should exercise. Thus the balance between local and State governments is destroyed. Home rule is sacrificed on the altar of popular discontent—the re¬ sult of a plan of political organization tliat does not provide for responsible ad¬ ministration under adequate popular con¬ trol. The fact of popular discontent with local authorities and of the irresponsi¬ bility and irresponsiveness of State offi¬ cers give to the special interests their opportunity. This accounts for the suc¬ cess of the lobby which is maintained at the State capital to get measures throu.gh that will give to the promoters their advantage at the expense of the local community. Some of the evils of the system may be mitigated by the vigilance and the organized efforts of local officers, but so long as the people seek protection by emasculation of the government itself—■ by refusing to give to officers the powers which are necessary to efficient admin¬ istration—any effort to obtain home rule can do little more than give temporary relief. How can the people be expected to be satisfied with the results obtained by an administration organized as has been that of New York City? The first proc¬ ess was gradually to limit and hamper the mayor, and to deprive him of powers