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Real estate record and builders' guide: [v. 97, no. 2504: Articles]: March 11, 1916

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REAL ESTATE AND NEW YORK, MARCH ,11, 1916 LOGICAL REMEDY FOR STATE INTERFERENCE Charter Changes Needed to Protect Government of City of New York from Local Appeals to Legislature By Dr. FREDERICK A, CLEVELAND, Director, Bureau of Municipal Research LET us keep in mind this fact: that the laws which are denounced as violating the principle of home rule sel¬ dom result from appeals originating out¬ side the city. Legislation imposing re¬ strictions and mandatory requirements on municipal authorities in almost every instance springs from .local intiative— is based on applications of citizens of the locality. These citizens are of two classes: (1) Those who distrust their officers, and (2) those who wish to take advantage of defects in organization which give rise to this distrust, and who seek thereby to further their own selfish ends. As set forth in the preceding article, this is the necessary result of charter defects. Appraisal of Present Charter. Whether critical judgment or sugges¬ tion of remedy is called for, the only ap¬ praisal of the present charter worthy of consideration is one based on known and accepted standards for judgment. Other¬ wise, opinion can be little more than bald assertion. Let it be first said then that the foundation upon which all our stand¬ ards for judgment of defects, as well as proposed remedies, must be erected is democracy; the notion that the aflfairs of the city shall be managed in a manner to suit the wishes of a majority; and that the purpose of the charter is to pro¬ vide the human machinery for doing the things the people of the locality want done. Reduced to definite forrnulae, this fundamental notion carries with it the following commonly accepted con¬ clusions: That all authority is derived from the people. That the government is an incor¬ porated trusteeship and exists only for the benefit of the people. That the form or type of organ¬ ization provided by charter should be such as is best adapted to the work to be done. That the work of the government is to do well what the people want done—i. e., to be efficient in render¬ ing such public services as the peo¬ ple desire the government to under¬ take for them. That since neither the people as such nor the corporation as trus¬ tee can do anything except through human agents, it is necessary to pro¬ vide in the charter for an organiza¬ tion made up of two kinds of pub¬ lic servants—those who are made responsible as doers, and those who are made responsible as determiners of the wishes of the people. That servants, whether public or private, can be made responsive and responsible in only one way, namely, by the master retaining and using the power to "hire and fire"—i. e., to elect those to whom they will entrust their affairs, and to promptly retire froin their service those in whom they no longer have confi¬ dence. AU these are homely commonplaces —they are conclusions of common ex¬ perience and common sense that have in more stately language been set up and generally accepted as principles of the DR. FREDERICK A. CLBVBL,AND. written and unwritten charters and con¬ stitutions of democracy. They apply to the most highly developed institutions which are premised on popular sov¬ ereignty. There are other conclusions of common experience and common sense that relate to that institutional method of exercising popular control known as the representative system or representative government. Government by Popular Assembly. Before stating the principles of repre¬ sentative government as distinguished from the more fundamental principles of democracy, let us reflect for a rnoment on the essentials of an organization for doing what the people want done with¬ out representation—i. e., let us consider the meaning of what is known as pure democracy. Here all authority is in the people; here, even in its simplest form, as when the Pilgrims of the Mayflower organized themselves as a body politic, they organized a fictitious corporate body which was to perform the func¬ tions of trustee for the welfare of the whole community. Even in this simple type they found it needful to make cer¬ tain persons responsible as doers, and certain other persons responsible as de¬ terminers of the will of the people. Here, however, in this small local community the people could come together in one assembly; but the people consented to certain persons acting for them as elec¬ tors—to certain ones finding out and ex¬ pressing for them what they wanted the government to do; and also to decide whom they would entrust with the do¬ ing—at the same time retiring those of their servants who were no longer trusted. For these purposes the peo¬ ple accepted or consented to certain persons — freemen — who would "vote" and thereby express the will of a ma¬ jority. Under these very simple, primitive conditions the things to be provided for in their charter, other than the settle¬ ment of private controversies, were to set out clearly: (1) who should be con¬ stituted "electors" (persons charged with no responsibility for doing, but only with determining); and (2) who should be the "executive" and what should be their powers. But as a matter of enforcing responsibility it is significant that they thoufht it needful that the doers be re¬ quired from time to time to coine before the assembled electors as determiners and give an account of themselves—at which time decision would also be made as to whether they were to be further entrusted with the people's business. Essentials of a Representative System. When the people come to be so numer¬ ous and widely scattered that they can¬ not meet at one place and conduct de¬ liberations, a representative system is adopted. Then another problem of or¬ ganization presents itself, viz., the selec¬ tion and control of a personnel who will meet from time to time to act for the people in place of the "electorate."' Under a representative system voters are not charged with the duty of meet¬ ing and passing upon what has been done and what is proposed by doers, and of deciding whether the people should con¬ tinue to support their executives; this duty is put on a "representative body" —subject, however, to a right of appeal by either party to the "electorate." Such are the main essentials of a representa¬ tive system, whether employed for pur¬ poses of public or private management. As a result of many years of use of the representative system, certain additional conclusions are commonly accepted as prniciples of popular control. Those which may be used for purposes of cri¬ tical judgment as to whether a particular charter or constitution is well adapted to making the government an instrument for doing what the people want done may be stated as follows: The representative body must have complete independence—i. e., if it is to be eflfective is must be composed of persons who, like the electorate, have no responsibility for carrying out the acts and proposals which are to be made the subject of critical review and discussion. Complete and accurate informa¬ tion about what has been done and what is proposed is an essential to a representative government quite as much as to a pure democracy— without this the government will not be trusted, because the doers can¬ not be held to account and the de¬ terminers cannot express the will of a majority. Popular sovereignty can be made effective only when the people pro¬ vide a means whereby they can. directly or indirectly, "hire and fire" both the chief doers and those who are elected as determiners—i. e., re¬ sponsibility to the people can be en¬ forced only when those who are carrying on the work of the people are trusted and require those who are not trusted to resign. The only effective way to force executives to resign on a vote of lack of confidence is to give to represen¬ tatives control over the purse. It is the duty of the representa-